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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2019, a new law student begins to study the foundational
stories of International Shoe,1 World-Wide Volkswagen,2 and Piper
Aircraft.3 That student learns on the first day of Civil Procedure class that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be “construed, administered,
and employed . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.”4 Fast-forward to 2022—that student
survived the COVID-19 pandemic, law school, and the bar exam. 
An issue presents itself in this burgeoning young lawyer’s very first
case. A key witness lives across the country and does not want to attend
trial in person because the inconvenient travel would cost time and money. 
The witness asks if there is any way to testify via Zoom or some other
videoconferencing technology to lessen the burden the witness would have
to bear. “This shouldn’t be an issue,” the naïve lawyer thinks. For instance,
while working as a clerk for a firm during the summer of 2020, the lawyer
had sat in on status conferences, depositions, and appellate oral arguments
held over Cisco Webex.5 The lawyer had attended birthdays, weddings,
and even funerals by videoconference during the pandemic. If a court was
willing to have the witness testify via a recorded video trial deposition, a
practice that was utilized commonly and without much effort even before
the pandemic, then surely the court would allow that witness to present
testimony live via videoconference. After all, the purpose of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is to ensure that litigation is as convenient and as
just as possible.6 However, the young lawyer is surprised to find that the
system of rules he has studied and relied upon has failed to fulfill its
Copyright 2021, by CHRISTOPHER J. VIDRINE.
* J.D./D.C.L., 2022. Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
3. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
5. Cisco Webex is a company that sells videoconferencing software.
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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3132021] COMMENT
purpose. The judge promptly denies the request to allow the witness to
testify via videoconference, saying, “The pandemic is over, kid. We don’t
do that anymore. Just request a de bene esse7 deposition.”
Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides courts
with a standard for permitting witness testimony at trial via remote
transmission.8 Courts prefer witnesses to provide testimony live and in
person;9 however, when that method is unavailable, courts may permit
parties to use trial depositions10 or remote-transmission technology to
present witness testimony at trial.11 Under Rule 32(a)(4), a court may
permit the use of a deposition to serve as testimony at trial when that
witness is deemed unavailable to provide live testimony due to the
proponent’s inability to secure the witness’s attendance by subpoena or
due to the witness’s death, illness, or distance from the proceeding.12 
Under the second clause of Rule 43(a), judges may use their discretion to
permit live remote testimony only if the litigant requesting permission has
shown both that it is for “good cause in compelling circumstances” and
that “appropriate safeguards” are in place.13 The limitations set forth in 
this clause are often interpreted in a manner that prevents witnesses from
testifying live via videoconferencing in preference to the use of trial
depositions.14 However, the first clause of Rule 43(a) implies that live
testimony in open court is strongly preferred, and this preference should
only be overcome in specific circumstances outlined by other federal rules
or statutes.15 This conservative approach to acceptance of testimony at trial
7. A de bene esse deposition is one that will be used to preserve witness
testimony for trial. These are colloquially called “trial depositions.” See Coface 
Collections N. Am., Inc. v. Newton, No. 11-52, 2012 WL 6738391, at *1 n.1 (D.
Del. Dec. 28, 2012).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (“For good cause in compelling circumstances and
with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by
contemporaneous transmission from a different location.”).
9. 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER & LUMEN N. MULLIGAN, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, RULES AND COMMENTARY, Rule 43 (2020).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4).
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(A)–(D).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment; see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(E).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (“At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be
taken in open court unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, these 
rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.”); 9A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2414 (4th ed. 2020).
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314 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
via remote transmission pursuant to Rule 43(a) functions as a quasi-
prohibition on the use of videoconferencing in judicial proceedings.16 Rule 
43(a) serves as an obstacle to parties’ ability to conveniently obtain the
speedy and inexpensive access to justice in civil litigation promised by
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17 
Moreover, this conservative interpretation of Rule 43(a) creates a
paradox in which a witness is procedurally available under Rule 32(a)(4),
but Rule 43(a) renders that same witness factually unavailable.18 In other
words, the court cannot compel the witness to testify live and in person
because, for example, the witness is outside of the court’s traditional 
subpoena power, but can compel the witness to testify live via remote
transmission pursuant to Rule 45(c)(1).19 Because the court is able to
procure the witness by a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45(c)(1), the witness
does not meet any of the criteria that would cause the court to deem him
or her unavailable for live testimony pursuant to Rule 32(a)(4).20 
Therefore, the use of a trial deposition in lieu of live testimony is not an
option for the court.21 However, the witness also cannot testify remotely 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Kivanc, 714 F.3d 782, 791 (4th Cir. 2013)
(denying request for a witness to present live testimony when the witness was in
poor health and the cost of traveling from Turkey to the United States for trial
would be burdensome); Humbert v. O’Malley, No. 11-0440, 2015 WL 1256458,
at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2015) (denying request for a witness to present live
testimony when a witness would have to travel from California to Maryland); In
re Mikolajczyk, No. 15-90015, 2015 WL 3505135, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. June
3, 2015) (“Despite the obvious inconvenience of traveling two hundred miles to
testify, the circumstances do not rebut the presumption favoring live testimony in
open court that Rule 43 raises.”).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
18. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c), 32(a)(4), 43(a).
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1) (“A subpoena may command a person to
attend a trial, hearing, or deposition only as follows: (A) within 100 miles of where
the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person; or (B)
within the state where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts
business in person if the person (i) is a party or a party’s officer; or (ii) is 
commanded to attend a trial and would not incur substantial expense.”).
20. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4). A witness is deemed unavailable
when he is dead; more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial; unable to
testify due to age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or unable to be procured by
subpoena. See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(A)–(D).
21. A party may only use the deposition of a witness as testimony at trial if
deemed unavailable pursuant to Rule 32(a)(4). See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4).
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3152021] COMMENT
because of the restrictions of Rule 43(a).22 Thus, although the witness does
not meet any of the criteria for unavailability under Rule 32(a)(4), the
witness is rendered unavailable because Rule 43(a)’s restrictions preclude
testifying via live remote testimony. This paradox has existed for some
time, but the need to resolve it has rapidly become much more pressing.23 
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic paralyzed many facets of society.24 
The federal court system found itself conducting most hearings and even
full-fledged jury trials via videoconferencing software, as quarantine
mandates confined judges, juries, attorneys, and litigants to their homes.25 
Courts have found that the mandatory restrictions brought about by
COVID-19 provided litigants with Rule 43(a)’s “good cause in compelling
circumstances” and thus have permitted witnesses to testify remotely via
videoconferencing during the pandemic.26 However, after the COVID-19 
pandemic, litigants will no longer be able to use the pandemic to show
“good cause in compelling circumstances.” Nevertheless, the widespread
use of videoconferencing is unlikely to go away. Therefore, the Judicial
Conference27 should recommend that the Supreme Court amend Rule 
43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide a more lenient
22. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (providing that the use of testimony
via remote transmission in judicial proceedings must be justified by “good cause
in compelling circumstances” to be permitted).
23. See generally discussion infra Section I.D.3.
24. See generally Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu & Vanessa Swales, See Which
States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-
order.html [https://perma.cc/H5UZ-FV5Q].
25. See Angela Morris, Lessons Learned, ‘History Made’ in First Zoom Jury 
Trial in a Criminal Case, LAW.COM TEXAS LAWYER (Aug. 11, 2020, 9:31 PM),
https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2020/08/11/lessons-learned-history-made-in-
nations-first-zoom-trial/ [https://perma.cc/6C3H-QQPK].
26. E.g., In re RFC & Rescap Liquidation Tr. Action, 444 F. Supp. 3d 967
(D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2020).
27. Proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are first
evaluated by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, which then
drafts the proposed amendment and transmits it to the Judicial Conference’s
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee). The
Standing Committee reviews the findings of the Advisory Committee and may
recommend it to the Judicial Conference. The Judicial Conference then
recommends the proposed amendment to the Supreme Court who may issue an
order to revise the rules before May 1 of the year in which it is to become effective.
Finally, Congress is given until December 1 of that year to modify or reject the 
amendment promulgated by the Supreme Court or that amendment will become
part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077.
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316 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
standard, based on judicial discretion that gives deference to the consent
of the parties. This would benefit civil litigants and the federal court
system in its entirety by providing a more accessible, efficient, and
convenient means of obtaining justice, better serving the purpose of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.28 
Part I of this Comment will provide background by discussing the
evolution of the concept of “convenience” in federal civil procedure.
Specifically, it will discuss how the common law and statutory rules of
federal civil procedure have adapted over time to the introduction of new
technology. This Part will also introduce the issues created by the sudden
introduction of widespread videoconferencing to the court system. Part II
will provide a rose-colored analysis of the current balancing test for
convenience in forum non conveniens and § 1404(a) venue transfers, and
how courts may apply the test in the context of the widespread use of
videoconferencing. This Part will then demonstrate how Rule 43(a) creates
the Zoom paradox. Part III will analyze the rationale behind Rule 43(a)
and identify its faults. Part IV will analyze how Canadian courts approach 
the use of videoconferencing. Part V will introduce a proposed amendment
to Rule 43(a). The proposed amendment provides a standard based on the
overarching concept of convenience found throughout the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The proposed amendment will place the determination
of whether to permit testimony via videoconferencing solely in the hands
of the judge, who should, in turn, defer to the consent of the parties.
I. CONVENIENCE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
Since the dawn of the American judicial system, the convenience of
litigation has been a concern.29 The most fundamental goal of American
federal civil procedure is “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”30 It logically follows that
all rules and concepts should be created, interpreted, and administered to
further this stated goal.31 Congress and the judiciary, in service of this goal, 
have developed statutes and common law doctrines that incorporate
28. See FED R. CIV. P. 1.
29. See generally Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73 (allowing
courts to take the deposition of a person whose testimony is necessary for a civil 
trial if the witness lives more than 100 miles from the place of trial); Judiciary Act 
of 1793, ch. 22, § 6, 1 Stat. 333 (prohibiting courts from issuing subpoenas to
compel witness testimony if the witness lives more than 100 miles from the place
of trial and outside of the district in which the court sits).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
31. Id.
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3172021] COMMENT
concerns over the convenience of litigation.32 These statutes and doctrinal
principles extend to many of the most fundamental concepts in civil
procedure, including personal jurisdiction.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
For a plaintiff to properly file a lawsuit in a federal district court, the
district court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant33 and
subject matter jurisdiction over the particular type of case.34 The personal
jurisdiction requirement is rooted in “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice” found to be implicit in due process afforded to citizens
of the United States by the Fourteenth Amendment.35 Courts have found
that two of these “traditional notions” are: (1) the defendant’s interest in
not being burdened by litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum and
(2) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.36 In
determining whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
courts must perform an “estimate of the inconveniences”37 that a defendant
would suffer from attending a trial in a distant jurisdiction.38 
B. Transfer of Venue
In addition to the personal and subject matter jurisdiction
requirements, the court in which the plaintiff brings the lawsuit must also
be the “proper venue” for the lawsuit.39 In contrast to the constitutional
roots of personal jurisdiction, the concept of venue finds its roots in
statutory law.40 A district court is a proper venue if a substantial part of the 
32. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. &
Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955); 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).
33. See RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE
23 (7th ed. 2016); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1887).
34. See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 33, at 181.
35. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
36. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(citing Kulko v. Cal. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)).
37. To “estimate” inconveniences is to consider the inconvenience a
defendant would suffer from a trial away from its home or principal place of
business in determining whether it is reasonable to subject that defendant to suit 
in a state where it is doing business.
38. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
39. See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 33, at 247.
40. See id.
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318 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
events that gave rise to the action occurred in, or the defendant resides in,
the judicial district in which the court sits.41 Also, venue is proper if the
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and no other venue is
proper.42 The statutory requirement that a district court be a proper venue 
attempts to ensure convenience for the litigants and witnesses.43 
In pursuit of the goal of ensuring convenient litigation, a district court,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, may transfer a case to any other judicial district
where the case could have been brought originally.44 The district court may
only do this if it determines that the transfer is necessary “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses” and doing so is “in the interest of
justice.”45 Courts have discretion in determining whether to transfer the 
case to a different court, with the primary consideration being whether the
proposed venue is more convenient than the original venue.46 When
deciding which venue provides greater convenience in a motion to transfer
venue, federal judges weigh private- and public-interest factors taken from
the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.47 
C. Forum Non Conveniens
Federal courts have developed the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens, which provides district courts with the authority to dismiss a
case in specific circumstances.48 Dismissal based on forum non conveniens
rests solely on the court’s determination that the chosen court is an
inconvenient forum and no convenient alternate forum within the federal
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
42. Id.
43. See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 33, at 247.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. FREER & PERDUE, supra note 33, at 263; see generally Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (explaining that the public interests
considered by courts include administrative difficulties resulting from court
congestion and a community’s interest in having localized interests decided at
home); id. at 508 (explaining that the private interests considered by courts
include the ease of access to proof, cost of obtaining willing witnesses, availability
of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, and any other factors which made
the trial “easy, expeditious and inexpensive”).
48. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (dismissing 
the case after finding that Scotland was an appropriate alternate forum and that
the United States was an inconvenient forum because witnesses and evidence
were in Scotland).
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3192021] COMMENT
court system exists to which the court can transfer the case.49 When 
determining whether to dismiss a case based on forum non conveniens, 
federal courts use the balancing test that the Supreme Court developed in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, which requires a court to weigh private and
public interests.50 
Under Gilbert, courts consider private interests, including the ease of 
access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining willing witnesses, the 
availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, and any other
factors that would make the trial “easy, expeditious and inexpensive."51 
Courts also consider public interests, such as the administrative difficulties
resulting from court congestion and the community’s interest in having
localized interests decided at home.52 When applying the Gilbert test to
determine if a transfer of venue under § 1404(a) is proper, courts generally
consider the convenience of witnesses to be the most important factor in
the test.53 
D. Evolution of Convenience
Although the concept of convenience is entrenched in many aspects
of federal civil procedure,54 courts have generally given convenience the
same meaning in every context: the convenience of litigating, that is, the
ability to secure a “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.”55 Because courts have generally given
convenience the same meaning in all contexts, judicial interpretations of
49. See id.
50. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501.
51. Id. at 508.
52. Id. at 508–09.
53. See Am. Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F. Supp. 254, 254 (W.D.
Mo. Jan. 29, 1980); ESPN, Inc. v. Quiksilver, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008); DeFazio v. Hollister Emp. Share Ownership Tr., 406
F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2005).
54. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1404; FED. R. CIV. P. 28(a)(2)(B), 42(b), 77(b);
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S.
310 (1945); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see generally Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (considering the
inconvenience of travel a defendant would incur in determining whether a court 
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S.
29, 32 (1955) (considering the inconvenience of travel the parties would suffer
from granting a motion to transfer venue); Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (considering the
inconvenience of travel the parties would suffer from granting a motion to dismiss
a case based on forum non conveniens).
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320 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
convenience in other areas of civil procedure are relevant to analyzing
convenience in the context of witness testimony under Rule 43(a).
Over time, the concept of convenience has evolved in the courts 
alongside technological advances in transportation and communication
that have made the everyday lives of Americans more convenient.56 To 
illustrate, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 authorized the
construction of 41,000 miles of the Interstate Highway System, making 
transportation easier and more convenient.57 In the years following the
Act, the United States Supreme Court recognized that advances in
communication and transportation made litigation in a distant forum much
less burdensome for purposes of personal jurisdiction.58 
1. The Interstate Highway Cases
In 1957, the Supreme Court in McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co. recognized a “trend . . . toward expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over . . . nonresidents.”59 The court attributed this to the
“nationalization of commerce” and the fact that advances in modern
transportation and communication made the burden of litigating in a
foreign state much less substantial.60 One year later, the Supreme Court in 
Hanson v. Denckla reaffirmed its previous statement in McGee, finding
that technological progress lessened the burden that defendants would be
forced to carry by litigating a suit in a foreign court.61 The Court
recognized that the standards for personal jurisdiction were evolving with
technological advancements in communication and transportation, but it
stated that this trend of relaxing standards would not lead to the abolition
of the concept of personal jurisdiction of state courts.62 The Court held that
despite modern technology making it less burdensome to litigate in a
foreign court, personal jurisdiction is more than just a “guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.”63 No matter how
convenient litigation in a distant forum may become, states are still limited
56. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286;
Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); Calix-Chacon v. Glob.
Int’l Marine, Inc., 493 F.3d 507, 515 (5th Cir. 2007).
57. Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374.
58. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 222–23; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51.
59. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222.
60. Id. at 223.
61. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51.
62. Id. at 251.
63. Id. at 250–51.
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3212021] COMMENT
in exercising personal jurisdiction to those individuals who have had
“minimal contacts” with the state.64 
In 1980, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
recognized that the purpose of requiring “minimum contacts” in
determining personal jurisdiction was to “protect[] the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum” and to protect
federalism and state sovereignty.65 The Court noted that the advances in
transportation and communication technology has accelerated even more
since McGee was decided 22 years prior.66 However, the Court further
emphasized that the convenience of the defendant is just one of the factors
in the determination of personal jurisdiction.67 The Court reasoned that the
concerns over interstate federalism can prevent states from exercising
jurisdiction despite that state being the most convenient location for
litigation.68 
2. Travel by Jet
In 1975, Judge Oakes of the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized in his dissent in Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc. that “in the year
1975 no forum is as inconvenient as it was in 1947” due to the
“extraordinary development of worldwide economical air travel by jet.”69 
Judge Oakes argued that modern advances made transportation easy and
inexpensive, making travelling to appear in court a “relatively simple”
task.70 His dissent even suggested that the “transportation revolution”
might call for a complete reexamination of the entire doctrine of forum
non conveniens.71 In his concurring opinion, Judge Mansfield agreed that
courts should consider the increased speed of travel and the ease of
communication when administering the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
but he did not agree with Judge Oakes that the principles of the doctrine
should be modified.72 
64. Id. at 251.
65. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 
(1980). “Federalism” refers to the division of power between the federal
government and state governments.
66. Id. at 294.
67. See id.
68. Id.




72. Id. at 454 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
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Twenty years after Judge Oakes’s dissent, the Second Circuit in Effron
v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc. acknowledged that Judge Oakes’s dissent may
have “provided the spark” for the Second Circuit’s holding that modern
transportation makes it so that a forum is not inconvenient simply because
it is distant from the parties.73 The Second Circuit disagreed with the
district court’s assertion that such a holding would deprive a party of its
“day in court.”74 The court reasoned that the right to a day in court is not
the right to give the actual presentation of the case, but rather to “be duly 
cited to appear and to be afforded an opportunity to be heard.”75 Thus, “[a]
plaintiff may have his ‘day in court’ without ever setting foot in a
courtroom.”76 Convenience continued its gradual evolution into the
Information Age.77 
3. The Information Age
In 2007, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Calix-Chacon v.
Global International Marine, Inc. held that a plaintiff’s financial or
physical inability to travel to a foreign court did not make the foreign
forum so inconvenient that he would be deprived of his day in court.78 The 
court reasoned that any plaintiff can have his day in court through the
power of “modern conveniences of electronic filing and
videoconferencing.”79 The Fifth Circuit’s eagerness to support the use of
videoconferencing, although understandable, seems to be based on a
misunderstanding that the rules for permitting videoconferencing in court
are carelessly permissive.80 
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have permitted
videoconferencing in court since 1996,81 this allowance was made with
great hesitance, and the formation of the rules show the Judicial
Conference’s trepidation.82 Federal courts have also contributed to the
73. Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7, 10 (2d Cir. 1995).
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. (citing Olsen v. Muskegon Piston Ring Co., 117 F.2d 163, 165 (6th
Cir. 1941)).
76. Id.
77. See generally Calix-Chacon v. Glob. Int’l Marine, Inc., 493 F.3d 507 (5th
Cir. 2007).
78. Id. at 515.
79. Id.
80. See generally discussion infra Part II, Part III.
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
82. See Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of
Meeting (Nov. 1991) (discussing the positive and negative aspects of embracing
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3232021] COMMENT
hesitancy in acceptance of videoconferencing technology by avoiding its
use in hearings due to unfamiliarity, increased strain on courtroom staff,
and the cost of the equipment necessary to support videoconferencing
software.83 This unwillingness to utilize videoconferencing in courts was
eventually put to the ultimate test in 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic
took the world by storm.
By mid-April 2020, courtrooms were closed across the nation after 45 
states had issued stay-at-home orders.84 This brought Zoom, Webex, and
other videoconferencing software companies to the forefront of society
and the legal system.85 Suddenly, courts across the nation began
conducting hearings and even full-fledged jury trials via
videoconferencing software.86 Once a science fiction trope,
videoconferencing is now a common reality.87 Similar to the interstate
system and commercial jet travel, videoconferencing has made the
everyday lives of Americans much more convenient. Adapting how the
courts apply the concept of convenience in the modern world is the natural
next step.88 
II. THE EFFECT OF VIDEOCONFERENCING ON THE CURRENT 
CONVENIENCE BALANCING TEST
Technological developments such as the interstate highway system
and the commercial jetliner have already rendered civil litigation much
more convenient than it was in the past, alleviating some of the concerns
courts once considered.89 Thus, the use of videoconferencing may have
little effect on certain areas of the law where convenience is considered. 
videoconferencing); Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes 
of Meeting (Dec. 1995) (discussing the positive and negative aspects of
embracing videoconferencing); see also discussion infra Section III.A.
83. See Auld v. Value Place Prop. Mgmt. LLC, No. 08-0798, 2009 WL
10690188, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 7, 2009); see also Iragorri v. United Techs.
Corp., 46 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 1999), vacated, 274 F.3d 65 
(2d Cir. 2001).
84. See Mervosh et al., supra note 24.
85. See Judiciary Authorizes Video/Audio Access During COVID-19 
Pandemic, U.S. COURTS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/
03/31/judiciary-authorizes-videoaudio-access-during-covid-19-pandemic [https:/
/perma.cc/V5S5-MFB8]; see also Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 15002, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
86. See Morris, supra note 25.
87. See, e.g., 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Stanley Kubrick Productions 1968).
88. See generally Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
89. See discussion supra Section I.D.
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324 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
One example is that videoconferencing will likely not have much effect
on the application of personal jurisdiction, because prior technological
advancements have already changed the way in which convenience is
considered for this purpose.90 In addition, convenience is not the most
important consideration in a court’s determination of personal jurisdiction,
so any effect would be negligible.91 Although videoconferencing will have
a profound impact on the court’s balancing of conveniences for venue
transfers and forum non conveniens, there are still aspects of that analysis
on which the use of videoconferencing will have little impact. 
Venue transfers pursuant to § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens
doctrine both entail the same balancing test; however, a motion for a venue
transfer requires a lesser showing of inconvenience than does a motion for
dismissal based on forum non conveniens.92 Naturally, the balancing test
for a motion to transfer venue is more susceptible to changes in
convenience brought on by technological advances because of this lesser
standard. Therefore, this Comment’s analysis will focus on the effect of
videoconferencing on the public and private interests considered in the
Gilbert balancing test as applied to transfers of venue.93 
A. Public Interests
The Gilbert court stated that the private interests of the litigants are
the most important considerations but also listed factors of public interest
that courts should consider as well.94 The relative docket congestion of the
transferor and transferee courts is a factor that courts consider as a public
90. See generally McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
91. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1780 (2017) (stating that even if there was no inconvenience suffered by a litigant
by being subjected to the jurisdiction of a distant state, “the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
State of its power to render a valid judgement”) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 444 U.S. at 294).
92. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (reasoning that
Congress’s drafting of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) indicates that Congress intended to
permit courts to grant motions for transfers of venue upon a lesser showing of
inconvenience).
93. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
94. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09 (factors mentioned by the court include:
“administrative difficulties” caused by court congestion, the burden of jury duty
placed on the community, and the court’s relative familiarity with the law
governing the case).
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interest in the balancing of conveniences, but this factor alone is not
dispositive.95 Instead, courts give it very little weight.96 Although this
factor is given little weight, it is still worth noting that the use of
videoconferencing would affect it. The widespread use of
videoconferencing in the court system allows federal courts to work far
more efficiently, reducing the administrative difficulties brought on by
court congestion.97 Rather than waiting for a specific date and time at
which all parties to a proceeding are available to travel to a courthouse for
in-person attendance, videoconferencing eliminates transportation as a 
hindering factor. 
Additionally, videoconferencing allows judges to work more
efficiently.98 Instead of exiting a proceeding, walking back to their
chambers to obtain the relevant documents for the next proceeding, and
finally walking into a different courtroom to preside over the next
proceeding, judges can be “transported” into their next proceeding with a
simple click while staying in their chambers with all relevant documents
within arm’s reach. This allows judges to hold more proceedings per day
in a quicker and more efficient manner.
Other public interests that courts consider are the transferor and
transferee courts’ relative familiarity with the law governing the case and
the interest in having local controversies adjudicated locally.99 The weight
given to these factors is dependent on factual information that does not
involve communications or transportation in any way.100 Thus, the
widespread use of videoconferencing will not affect the application of
95. P & S Bus. Machines, Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 808 (11th
Cir. 2003).
96. See United States v. Scott & Williams, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 531, 535
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1950).
97. See Gerald G. Ashdown & Michael A. Menzel, The Convenience of the
Guillotine?: Video Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 63, 
64 n.2 (2002) (discussing how a videoconferencing program in the First Circuit 
of Hawaii allowed the court to reduce “case processing time” by 50%).
98. See E-mail from Mark Hornsby, U.S. Magistrate Judge, W.D. La. (Sept.
30, 2020) (on file with author) (“[Using videoconferencing] [j]udges can jump
from one proceeding to the next effortlessly, allowing us to handle more matters
over the same period of time.”).
99. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09.
100. See Presidential Hosp., LLC v. Wyndham Hotel Grp., LLC, 333 F. Supp.
3d 1179 (D.N.M. July 2, 2018) (finding that the weight of the interest of a local 
court in a particular controversy is only substantial when the merits of the action
are unique to the area of the local court); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612,
645 (1964) (observing that it is appropriate to conduct a trial in the state whose
laws govern the case).
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326 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
these factors. Courts have also considered other factors that affect the
speediness and efficiency of trial, but these generally have little to no
effect on the balancing test.101 In addition to these public interests, courts
also consider the inconveniences that the parties may suffer if the transfer
of venue were granted.102 
B. Private Interests
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court wrote that the private interests of the
litigants is the most pressing factor a court must consider when
determining whether to grant a motion to transfer venue.103 The Court
provided a non-exhaustive list of important considerations, such as the
ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process
for unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining the attendance of willing
witnesses.104 In ruling on a motion to transfer under § 1404(a), courts use
these factors in their consideration of the “convenience of parties and
witnesses.”105 
1. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
In 1970, the Supreme Court amended Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to make clear that requests for document discovery
applied to electronic data compilations.106 In 1980, the district court in
American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp. found that the then-recent
invention of photocopying made acquiring access to documents much 
easier, making the location of records and documents a less convincing
reason for a transfer of venue.107 Then, in 2006, the Supreme Court
amended Rule 34 again to accommodate for the growth in electronically
101. United Ocean Servs. v. Powerhouse Diesel Servs., 932 F. Supp. 2d 717,
733 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2013) (taking into consideration the fact that a transfer of
venue would create the need for a third continuance of the trial); Rhodes v.
Barnett, 117 F. Supp. 312, 316 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1953) (taking into
consideration the fact that the action was based on contract law and not tort law);
Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Mid-S. Materials Corp., 816 F. Supp. 230, 234 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 1993) (taking into consideration the existence of a permissive forum
selection clause in a contract).
102. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 33, at 263; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
107. Am. Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F. Supp. 254, 264 (W.D. Mo.
Jan. 29, 1980).
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3272021] COMMENT
stored information and to anticipate an increased use of computerized
information.108 Because of these advances in modern technology, litigants
do not typically face any substantial burdens associated with discovery.109 
Today, most business documents are “stored, transferred and reviewed
electronically.”110 When most relevant documents are electronic, the
physical location of those documents is less important to determinations
of convenience regarding a motion for a transfer of venue pursuant to
§ 1404(a).111 
Despite this, many litigants have argued that videoconferencing would
put a substantial burden on their ability to present documentary evidence
to the court and to witnesses during examination; but courts have
consistently found that sufficient methods exist to effectively present
documentary evidence while videoconferencing.112 Technology has made
gaining access to documents and other sources of proof much less
inconvenient, but that does not render the ease of access to sources of proof
nugatory.113 There may be instances where a court’s decision hinges on its 
ability to view a physical premises or physical evidence that could not be
easily transported to a court. However, in cases in which relevant
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
109. See XPRT Ventures, LLC v. eBay, Inc., No. 10-595, 2011 WL 2270402,
at *3 (D. Del. June 8, 2011).
110. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
111. Jagex Ltd. v. Impulse Software, 750 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (D. Mass. Aug.
16, 2010); Pence v. Gee Grp., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 843, 857 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2017).
112. Sussel v. Wynne, No. 05-00444, 2006 WL 2860664, at *3 n.7 (D. Haw.
Oct. 4, 2006); Scott Timber, Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 498, 501 (2010);
see also Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 699 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that a
prisoner in a civil rights case was able to do everything via videoconference that
he could have done if he were physically present, including presenting twelve
witnesses, cross-examining witnesses, and offering other evidence); accord
Arconti v. Smith, 2020 O.R. 2872, para. 36–37 (Can.) (citing Capic v. Ford Motor
Co. of Austl. Ltd. [2020] FCA 486 (15 Apr. 2020) (Austl.)) (agreeing with an
Australian federal court judge that although inexperience with videoconferencing
may cause some difficulty in sharing documents, there are methods with which
litigators can effectively share documents while videoconferencing); Sandhu v.
Siri Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara of Alta., 2020 ABQB 359, para. 23–25, 36 (first
citing Alberta Cent. Airways Ltd. v. Progressive Air. Serv. Ltd., 2000 ABCA 36,
para. 1–3 (Can.); then citing De Carvalho v. Watson, 2000 CanLII 28217, para.
14–17 (Can.); and then citing Code Inc. v. Indep. High Electoral Comm’n, 2012
O.R. 2208, para. 20–21 (Can.)) (agreeing with caselaw that found that documents
could be made available to the court and witnesses while videoconferencing).
113. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 316 (5th Cir. 2008).
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328 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
documentary evidence is mostly electronic or there is no need to view any
physical premises, videoconferencing and other modern technologies have
rendered sources of proof to be just as accessible in a distant forum as they
are in a court near the physical location associated with the cause of action.
2. Convenience of Parties
When weighing the relative convenience of parties, federal courts
generally look to the parties’ preferred fora and the parties’ burdens of
litigating in each forum in the context of their respective physical and
financial conditions.114 The use of videoconferencing would make it
undeniably more convenient for parties to litigate in a distant forum. 
Rather than forcing a financially downtrodden party to bear the costs of
litigation in a distant forum, videoconferencing can provide a much more
cost-efficient means for parties to judicially resolve disputes. Whether a
party is physically inconvenienced by age, illness, or disability,
videoconferencing can provide a method for that party to “have his ‘day
in court’ without ever setting foot in a courtroom.”115 Although the
convenience of parties is a relevant factor to the balancing of
conveniences, it is typically given less weight than the convenience of
witnesses, because the convenience of witnesses is a factor that
substantially affects the convenience of litigation for the parties.116 
3. Convenience of Witnesses
When applying the Gilbert test to determine if a transfer of venue
under § 1404(a) is proper, courts generally consider the convenience of
witnesses as the most important factor in the test.117 Courts consider the 
nature and significance of the testimony that any witness will provide in
114. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a motion for a change of venue was denied in part because the
corporate defendant would not be as financially burdened by litigating in
California as the individual plaintiff); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 3847.
115. Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1995).
116. E.g., ESPN, Inc. v. Quiksilver, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549–50 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008); see also DermaMed, Inc. v. Spa de Soleil, Inc., 152 F. 
Supp. 2d 780, 784 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2001) (“[I]t is only if witnesses are 
unavailable for trial and documents incapable of being produced in the forum that
the convenience of parties carries sufficient weight to render transfer of venue
appropriate.”).
117. Am. Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F. Supp. 254, 254 (W.D. Mo.
Jan. 29, 1980); ESPN, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 547; DeFazio v. Hollister Emp. Share
Ownership Tr., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2005).
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tandem with any inconvenience that the witness will suffer from attending
trial.118 Thus, the convenience of a party’s material witness may outweigh
the convenience of many of the opposing party’s non-essential
witnesses.119 The court in Gilbert listed the availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling witnesses and the cost of obtaining
willing witnesses as two separate considerations.120 However, it is well
established that a court’s analysis of the convenience of witnesses can be
distilled down to the availability121 of material witnesses and the ability to 
secure their live testimony at trial, whether voluntarily or through a
subpoena.122 This stems from the principle that litigants should not be
forced to try their cases relying on deposition testimony due to the inability
of a court to compel live testimony.123 
a. The Cost of Obtaining Attendance of Willing Witnesses
Due to the voluntary nature of the willing witness,124 courts consider
factors that may create obstacles to the attendance of the willing witness
118. E.g., Hammann v. 1-800 Ideas.com, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (D.
Minn. Sept. 7, 2006); comScore, Inc. v. Integral Ad Sci., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d
677, 688 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2013).
119. See, e.g., Hammann, 455 F. Supp. at 962 (quoting Nelson v. Master Lease
Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1397, 1402 (D. Minn. Apr. 2, 1991)) (“This factor, however,
‘should not be determined solely upon a contest between the parties as to which of
them can present a longer list of possible witnesses located in the respective districts;
the party seeking the transfer must clearly specify the essential witnesses to be called
and must make a general statement of what their testimony will cover.’”).
120. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
121. An unavailable witness is one who falls under one of the categories listed
in Rule 32(a)(4). A witness is deemed unavailable when he is dead; more than
100 miles from the place of hearing or trial; unable to testify due to age, illness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or unable to be procured by subpoena. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(A)–(D).
122. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995);
United Ocean Servs. v. Powerhouse Diesel Servs., 932 F. Supp. 2d 717, 731 (E.D.
La. Mar. 11, 2013); Am. Standard, 487 F. Supp. at 262 n.7; Hotel Constructors,
Inc. v. Seagrave Corp., 543 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1982).
123. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 511; B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. Boggs, 426 F. Supp.
1091, 1105 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1977); United Ocean Servs., 932 F. Supp. 2d at
731; see also Hotel Constructors, 543 F. Supp. at 1051 (“It is well settled that the 
trier of fact should not be forced to rely on deposition evidence when the
deponent’s live testimony can be procured [in another forum].”).
124. The willing witness is a witness who will voluntarily attend trial to 
provide live testimony.
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330 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
in a particular court.125 These factors include the expenses necessary for
attendance and the length of time the witness must be away from home
and work.126 The use of videoconferencing for witness testimony
substantially reduces the cost of attending trial for these willing witnesses.
Witnesses who are willing to attend trial but do not want to suffer the costs 
of travel or miss days of work could very easily give testimony, subject to
direct and cross-examination, without ever having to leave their homes. It
is unreasonable that in an age of advanced electronic communication when
videoconferencing is commonplace, a witness may need to embark on a
multi-day journey to present an hour of live testimony at trial.127 Although
important, the cost of obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses is
substantially outweighed by the availability of compulsory process for
witnesses in the respective courts; there is no reason to worry about willing
witnesses changing their minds when the court can compel them to present
live testimony at trial.128 
b. The Availability of Compulsory Process for Unwilling Witnesses
As stated above, the essence of a court’s consideration of the
convenience of witnesses is whether a particular court can secure the live
125. The ability to secure live testimony at trial is the underlying factor, so
when a witness is willing to testify live, the ability to compel her testimony
becomes less important. Rather, the court considers the cost of obtaining her
willing testimony, because that may affect the witness’s willingness to testify. See
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 3851.
126. In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Additional
distance means additional travel time; additional travel time increases the
probability for meal and lodging expenses; and additional travel time with
overnight stays increases the time which these fact witnesses must be away from
their regular employment.”); Crown Crafts Infant Prods., Inc. v. Smart Deals, Inc.,
No. 11-354, 2012 WL 276063, at *1 (M.D. La. Jan. 11, 2012) (reasoning that an
increase in travel costs to two nonparty witnesses was grounds to deny a motion
to transfer venue to the Middle District of Louisiana from the Southern District of
Florida when all other factors were equal); Actmedia, Inc. v. Ferrante, 623 F. 
Supp. 42, 44 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1985) (reasoning that the severe disruption of
business for a small corporation was grounds to grant a motion to transfer venue
from New York to Oregon when the adverse party was a large corporation doing
business nationwide and all activities relevant to the suit took place in Oregon).
127. In re Hudson, 710 F.3d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that “[t]oday
documents can be scanned and transmitted by email; witnesses can be deposed,
examined, and cross-examined remotely and their videotaped testimony shown at
trial”).
128. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995).
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3312021] COMMENT
testimony of important witnesses at trial.129 Gilbert recognized that if a 
judge were to decide on a forum “where litigants cannot compel personal
attendance and may be forced to try their cases on deposition,” then that
result would be unsatisfactory for the court, the jury, and the litigants.130 
If a witness does not fall within the geographical limits of compliance set
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,131 the court cannot compel
attendance of the proceeding and may deem the witness unavailable to
testify at trial.132 
A witness is considered unavailable if: (1) the party offering the
deposition cannot secure the attendance of the witness by subpoena, (2)
the witness is dead, (3) the witness is more than 100 miles from the place
of the hearing or outside of the United States, or (4) the witness is unable
to attend because of age, infirmity, or imprisonment.133 If a witness is
deemed unavailable, a party may use a deposition of that unavailable
witness for any purpose at trial.134 However, Judge McMahon of the
Southern District of New York put it quite clearly in ESPN, Inc. v.
Quiksilver, Inc. when he stated, “common sense dictates that when one
party’s witnesses are severely inconvenienced or, worse yet, unavailable
because of an inability to compel attendance, the party itself is severely
inconvenienced,” because it forces that party to depend solely on
deposition testimony at trial.135 The use of depositions at trial is not to be
desired because “[i]t is only the absence of live testimony from trial that
creates the inconvenience.”136 
i. Videoconferencing and Availability
The widespread use of videoconferencing in civil litigation could
seemingly make securing witness testimony tremendously convenient, no
matter the forum, by providing a method that makes the dreaded trial
129. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 3851.
130. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511 (1947); see also B.J. 
McAdams, Inc. v. Boggs, 426 F. Supp. 1091, 1105 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1977).
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1) (providing that a court may compel witnesses to
attend a trial, hearing, or deposition that is within 100 miles of his residence or a
location in which he regularly conducts business in person).
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(D).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4).
134. Id.
135. ESPN, Inc. v. Quiksilver, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
15, 2008).
136. United Ocean Servs. v. Powerhouse Diesel Servs., 932 F. Supp. 2d 717,
731 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2013).
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332 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
deposition relatively obsolete. In fact, not only do the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure make allowances for presenting live testimony in open 
court via videoconferencing,137 but they also provide that the geographic
limitations set out for service of subpoenas work in a complementary way
with videoconferencing.138 
Rule 45 provides that a subpoena is issued from the court in which the
case is pending,139 and that the subpoena can be served anywhere in the 
United States.140 Subpoenas can compel witnesses to testify at a
proceeding, so long as the proceeding is within 100 miles of the witness’s
residence, place of employment, or area in which the witness regularly
conducts business in person.141 Rule 43(a) provides that testimony that is
transmitted from a different location is considered given in open court.142 
Thus, when read in pari materia, a court may issue a subpoena for a
witness to appear at a place within 100 miles of his home to testify via
remote transmission, regardless of the location of the court.143 For
example, a court in the Eastern District of Louisiana could compel a 
witness who resides in New York to physically travel to any location
within 100 miles of his home to testify via videoconference for a hearing
that is physically happening in New Orleans.
The Advisory Committee’s144 note on the 2013 amendment to Rule 45 
expressly states that courts can compel a witness to testify at trial via
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 45, advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment
(“When an order under Rule 43(a) authorizes testimony from a remote location,
the witness can be commanded to testify from any place described in Rule
45(c)(1).”). A court may compel nonparty witnesses to attend a trial, hearing, or
deposition that is within 100 miles of his residence or a location in which he
regularly conducts business in person. A court can compel party witnesses to
attend a trial, hearing, or deposition that is within the state where the person
resides or regularly conducts business in person. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1).
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(2).
140. Id.
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1).
142. GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 9, at Rule 43.
143. Id.
144. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure is a body of the
Judicial Conference of the United States that studies the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and advises the Judicial Conference on how they should be amended.
The rulemaking process generally begins with the advisory committee evaluating
a proposed amendment to the Rules, which they then may recommend to the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. If the Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure approves of the amendment, it recommends the changes 
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3332021] COMMENT
remote transmission from any place described in Rule 45(c)(1).145 The
Advisory Committee discussed and acknowledged this interplay between
Rule 43(a) and Rule 45 as far back as May 1993, when the Committee
made the first proposal to amend Rule 43(a) to provide for testimony via
remote transmission.146 At that time, the Committee discussed the 
possibility of modifying the language of the proposed amendment to Rule
43(a) to more directly indicate the relationship between the two, saying,
“The court may permit electronic transmission of testimony if the witness
cannot be compelled to appear at trial or is excused from appearing at trial
[under Rule 45].”147 This proposal would be realized in the 1996
amendment.
During the May 1993 committee meeting, it was suggested that
reading Rule 43(a) and Rule 45 in tandem would allow courts to “deal
flexibly with the different needs of different situations.”148 The Committee
unanimously agreed that there was no “present reason” to discuss any
further the possibility of amending Rule 45 to provide for nationwide
subpoenas.149 Despite the open intent of the Advisory Committee for Rule
45 to be interpreted to allow courts to compel remote testimony in a
to the Judicial Conference, which in turn recommends the proposed amendment
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 45, advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment. Rule
45(c)(1) provides:
A subpoena may command a person to attend a deposition only as
follows:
(A) within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or
regularly transacts business in person; or
(B) within the state where the person resides, is employed, or regularly
transacts business in person, if the person
(i) is a party or a party’s officer; or
(ii) is commanded to attend a trial and would not incur substantial 
expense.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1).
146. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Meeting 18
(May 1993).
147. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Meeting Agenda III-C 
at 2 (May 1993).
148. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Meeting Agenda
Additional Rules Proposals at 9 (May 1993).
149. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Meeting 18
(May 1993).
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334 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
witness’s local area,150 some courts have refused to interpret the rule this 
way,151 while others have embraced this change.152 
On the contrary, courts unanimously agree that a court may compel a
witness to attend a video deposition that is outside of the court’s district
but within 100 miles of the witness’s local area.153 For example, a court in 
the Western District of Oklahoma may subpoena a witness residing in 
Washington, D.C. to appear at a place within 100 miles of Washington,
D.C. to give testimony in front of a camera for a video deposition. A party
can then later play that video recording in Oklahoma City at trial to serve
as testimony.154 It does not logically follow that a court can issue a
subpoena compelling a recorded video deposition to be played at a later
trial, but that same subpoena may not be issued if the witness does the
exact same thing, yet the testimony is transmitted live to Oklahoma City.
ii. The Effect of Rule 43(a) on Availability
In theory, videoconferencing makes almost every witness available 
that would otherwise be deemed unavailable pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.155 The use of videoconferencing under a proper
interpretation of Rule 43(a) expands the availability of witnesses by
providing parties with greater power to procure live witness testimony by
subpoena. Videoconferencing allows a witness to testify at a faraway trial
without having to leave a 100-mile radius around her home. 
Videoconferencing also allows elderly, ill, infirm, or imprisoned witnesses
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 45, advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment.
151. See Sutphin v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-01379, 2020 WL 5229448, at
*2 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 1, 2020); Roundtree v. Chase Bank USA, No. 13-239, 2014
WL 2480259, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 3, 2014); Ping-Kuo Lin v. Horan Capital 
Mgmt., LLC, No. 14 Civ. 5202, 2014 WL 3974585, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2014); Atkinson v. MacKinnon, No. 14-CV-736, 2016 WL 3566278, at *1–2 
(W.D. Wis. June 24, 2016); Gipson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 239 F.R.D. 280,
281 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2006).
152. See In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 3:11-MD-2244-K, 2016 WL 9776572, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20,
2016); In re Xarelto (Rivaroxabain) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2592, 2017 WL
2311719, at *4 (E.D. La. May 26, 2017); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 12-CV-00064, 2014 WL 107153, at *7 (W.D. La. Jan. 8, 2014); Kahn
v. Sanofi U.S. Servs., Inc., No. 21-mc-01919, ECF No. 14 (E.D. La. Nov. 3, 2021)
(PACER); see also In re May, No. 13-3064, 2014 WL 12923988, at *3 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. July 9, 2014).
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1).
154. See generally FED R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(B).
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(B)–(E).
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3352021] COMMENT
to testify at trial without having to endure the hardships associated with
attendance. Unless the witness is dead or exceptional circumstances exist
that make it desirable to permit the use of a trial deposition,156 
videoconferencing should be used to allow for almost all witnesses to be
available for live testimony at trial.
Sadly, this is not the current state of affairs. Although the advisory
note to Rule 45 asserts that courts should be allowed to compel witnesses
anywhere in the country to testify live at trial via videoconference while
staying in the comfort of their own home,157 Rule 43(a) only permits the
testimony via videoconference in the narrowest of circumstances.158 Rule 
43(a) provides that courts may only use their discretion to permit
testimony via remote transmission when there is “good cause in
compelling circumstances” and “appropriate safeguards” have been put in 
place.159 The Advisory Committee note to Rule 43(a) even states that
depositions are superior to videoconferencing for obtaining the testimony
of witnesses who cannot be compelled to testify at trial.160 
This puts witnesses in a paradoxical situation—hereinafter referred to
as “the Zoom paradox”—in which they are simultaneously available and
unavailable, causing inconvenience for all. For example, a party to a
matter in the Eastern District Court of Louisiana motions the court to
compel a witness who lives in New York to testify at trial via
videoconferencing in his residence because the journey to Louisiana 
would be an inconvenience. Rule 45(c)(1) permits the court to compel a
witness to testify at trial so long as the subpoena does not compel him to 
go further than 100 miles from his home.161 Thus, the court cannot compel
the witness to testify at trial in person, but testimony via videoconference
could be an option. However, the Advisory Committee note to Rule 43(a)
states that permitting live testimony at trial via videoconference is not
justified by showing the mere inconvenience of a witness.162 Therefore,
testimony at trial via videoconferencing is not an option. This witness also
does not meet any of the criteria that would deem him unavailable under
156. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(E).
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment.
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to
1996 amendment.
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment.
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c).
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment.
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336 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Rule 32.163 Hence, the witness cannot testify by trial deposition. The
witness is both available and unavailable.
C. Rule 43(a) is the Inconvenience
The widespread use of videoconferencing in judicial proceedings is 
the next, natural step in the evolution of the concept of convenience. Even
if the paradoxical interplay of Rule 43(a) and Rule 45(c) did not exist, Rule
43(a) is still a quasi-prohibition on live testimony at trial in the form of
videoconferencing.164 The typical alternative to live testimony via
videoconferencing is not in-person testimony, but rather trial depositions
submitted pursuant to Rule 32165—a method that the Supreme Court in
Gilbert deemed “not satisfactory to court, jury or most litigants.”166 
The Gilbert test is used to provide litigants with the most convenient
access to judicial relief. Videoconferencing can provide a method to 
reduce financial and logistical issues, making litigation much more
convenient for the parties. Videoconferencing can provide a cost-effective
means of obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses and can even
provide a method to allow almost any court to compel unwilling witnesses.
Outside of alleviating court congestion, the use of videoconferencing
would have little effect on the public-interest factors contemplated under
Gilbert; however, these factors are not as important as the private-interest
factors that the test considers.
With the Gilbert test, courts consider all “problems that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”167 Videoconferencing provides
litigants with a tool that can make litigation much more convenient, but
Rule 43(a) prevents videoconferencing from being widely used. The
problem isn’t the ability to conveniently conduct a trial. The problem is
Rule 43(a).
III. THE FAULTS OF RULE 43(A)
In 1996, the Supreme Court amended Rule 43(a) to permit witnesses 
to appear in open court for testimony by “contemporaneous transmission
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(A). The witness is not dead; within 100 miles
from the place of trial; ill, imprisoned, or infirm; or unable to be compelled. Nor
can the court give proper regard to the importance of live testimony and reject it
in favor of a trial deposition.
164. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
165. GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 9, at Rule 43.
166. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511 (1947).
167. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
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3372021] COMMENT
from a different location.”168 One might imagine a virtual-reality
courtroom in which all participants at trial interact over electronic means
from many scattered locations. While formulating the amendment for
recommendation to the Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee rejected
this idea and approached this innovation with caution.169 The newly
amended rule allowed this use of technology, so long as a party showed
“good cause in compelling circumstances” and that “appropriate
safeguards” were in place.170 
A. The Rationale of the Requirements
The Advisory Committee note accompanying the amendment warns
that courts must not forget the importance that the American judicial
tradition places on live testimony.171 Moreover, the note provides that the
solemnity of the trial and presence of the judge “may exert a powerful
force for truthtelling.”172 One must be able to judge the demeanor of a
witness face to face.173 The Committee note expressly states that a mere
showing that attending the trial would inconvenience the witness does not
justify transmission.174 However, a showing that a witness is unavailable 
for testimony at trial due to unexpected reasons is considered a persuasive
showing of good cause in compelling circumstances.175 
Moreover, the Advisory Committee also suggested that although a
stipulation is not binding on the court, an agreement by the parties that
testimony should be presented by remote transmission can be considered 
good cause in compelling circumstances.176 The jurisprudence in which
courts interpret whether situations are considered a good cause in
compelling circumstances is inconsistent. Some courts have blatantly
disregarded the Committee note, but others have strictly adhered to it.177 
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
169. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Meeting
(April 1994); Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of
Meeting (October 1994).
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).






177. Compare Sussel v. Wynn, No. 05-00444, 2006 WL 2860664, at *3–4 (D. 
Haw. Oct. 4, 2006) (finding good cause was shown in compelling circumstances
when it would be expensive to have a witness travel from Alabama to Hawaii for
a pretrial conference), and F.T.C. v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 1
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338 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
The note also explains that the “appropriate safeguards” mentioned in
the amendment are to ensure that the person testifying is properly
identified as the witness and that the witness is not being influenced by
improper, off-camera coaching.178 The Committee suggests that
depositions provide a “superior means of securing the testimony of a
witness” compared to testimony by transmission.179 Additionally, the note 
states that transmission of only audio could be sufficient, but video
transmission is preferable when the cost of video transmission “is
reasonable in relation to the matters in dispute, the means of the parties,
and the circumstances that justify transmission.”180 
There are not many cases in which courts interpret what appropriate
safeguards need to be adopted to allow for testimony via
videoconferencing. However, the case law that does recognize when
appropriate safeguards have been adopted focuses primarily on whether
the witness is under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whether the 
witness’s identity can be verified by the fact-finder.181 Although the
“additional safeguards” requirement does not impose much of a restriction
on the use of videoconferencing, many courts have interpreted the good-
cause-in-compelling-circumstances requirement to restrict the use of
videoconferencing to the narrowest of circumstances.182 
This conservative approach to acceptance of testimony at trial via 
remote transmission pursuant to Rule 43(a) has served as a quasi-
prohibition on the use of videoconferencing. Consequently, Rule 43(a) is 
an obstacle to parties’ ability to conveniently obtain the speedy and
inexpensive access to justice in civil litigation promised by Rule 1 of the
(D.D.C. 2000) (disagreeing with the Committee Notes and finding good cause
was showing in compelling circumstances when a witness would have to travel
from Oklahoma to Washington, D.C.), with Humbert v. O’Malley, No. 11-0440,
2015 WL 1256458, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2015) (finding no good cause was
shown when a witness would have to travel from California to Maryland), and In 
re Mikolajczyk, No. 15-90015, 2015 WL 3505135, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. June
3, 2015) (“Despite the obvious inconvenience of traveling two hundred miles to
testify, the circumstances do not rebut the presumption favoring live testimony in
open court that Rule 43 raises.”).
178. FED R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 9, at Rule 43.
182. See generally United States v. Kivanc, 714 F.3d 782, 791 (4th Cir. 2013)
(denying request for a witness to present live testimony when the witness was in
poor health and the cost of traveling from Turkey to the U.S. for trial would be 
burdensome); Humbert, 2015 WL 1256458, at *2; In re Mikolajczyk, 2015 WL
3505135, at *1.
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3392021] COMMENT
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.183 A few vital flaws make Rule 43(a) so 
restrictive.
B. The Preference for Trial Depositions is Misguided
Rule 43(a)’s preference for trial depositions over live remote 
testimony is contradictory to the courts’ preference for live testimony in
open court established in the first clause of the rule.184 Rule 43(a) was
originally promulgated to combat the abuses that developed under the old
practice of only using testimony by deposition.185 The primary purpose of
establishing this Rule was to test the accuracy of witness testimony by
allowing the trier of fact to analyze the demeanor of witnesses and by
subjecting the witness to cross-examination.186 On the one hand, live 
testimony is still preferred over trial deposition testimony.187 On the other
hand, the Committee note for Rule 43(a) suggests that depositions provide
a “superior means of securing the testimony of a witness” compared to
testimony by live remote transmission when the witness cannot be
compelled to testify in person at trial.188 
The availability of compelling a witness to testify via remote
transmission should not supplant the admission of deposition testimony
under Rule 32.189 Indeed, the two methods “are meant to compl[e]ment 
each other; and depending on the nature of the case and the circumstances
involved, one procedure may be preferred over another.”190 However, it
does not stand to reason that introduction of a recorded video deposition
should be preferred over the use of live testimony via remote transmission
when the two methods offer essentially the same opportunity to observe
the witness’s demeanor.191 
Requests for leave to take a deposition via remote transmission
pursuant to Rule 30(b)(4) are liberally granted, so long as doing so will
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
184. FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 43(a) (“At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be 
taken in open court unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, these 
rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.”)
185. In re Adair, 965 F.2d 777, 780 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992).
186. Id. at 780.
187. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
188. FED R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment.
189. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 32 (permitting the use of depositions at trial 
in certain conditions, such as when a witness is unavailable).
190. RLS Assocs., LLC v. United Bank of Kuwait PLC, No. 01 Civ. 1290,
2005 WL 578917 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2005).
191. GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 9, at Rule 43.
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340 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
not cause any real prejudice.192 Courts do not subject this remote 
deposition to any further scrutiny than a video deposition recorded for
introduction at trial under Rule 32.193 This means that a party can more
easily present a deposition at trial than live testimony under Rule 43(a), 
even though they are both recorded in the exact same manner and using 
the exact same technology.194 This result is completely inapposite in light
of the federal courts’ strong preference for live testimony over recorded
testimony.195 
Additionally, the proponent of a video deposition at trial is not
required to present the video but can merely provide the trier of fact with
a transcript of the deposition.196 Another party may request that the
proponent present the deposition in non-transcript form, but absent a court
order, there is no requirement for the proponent of the video deposition to
present the video at trial to the trier of fact.197 Although many courts worry
about the potentially diminished ability of the trier of fact to observe the
witness’s demeanor with live remote testimony,198 the use of a transcript
from a recorded video deposition makes it entirely impossible for the trier
of fact to observe and properly evaluate the credibility of the witness. 
The primary reason for the preference for recorded video depositions
at trial over remote transmission of testimony seems to be the notice
requirement for depositions by oral examination under Rule 30.199 
However, the Committee note for the 1996 amendment to Rule 43(a)
provides that appropriate safeguards must be in place to ensure advance
notice is given to parties so that they may have the opportunity to depose
the witness or argue that the court should require the testimony to be
conducted in person.200 Since advance notice is recommended for both
situations, giving all parties the opportunity to be adequately represented 
192. GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 9, at Rule 30.
193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 32.
194. Compare GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 9, at Rule 30, with FED. R.
CIV. P. 43(a).
195. GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 9, at Rule 32.
196. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(c).
197. Id.
198. See generally Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 2001); Stoner v. Sowders,
997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993); Edwards v. Logan, 38 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467
(W.D. Va. 1999).
199. FED R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s notes to 1996 amendment
(explaining that deposition procedures ensure that all parties have the opportunity
to be represented during the testimony).
200. Id.
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when the witness gives testimony, the Committee’s reasoning for
preferring depositions over remote testimony is not sound.201 
According to the Advisory Committee, if a party requests leave from
the court for the remote transmission of testimony at trial, and the party
could have reasonably foreseen the circumstances leading to the request,
the court should not consider that showing as good cause in compelling
circumstances.202 In the same breath, the Advisory Committee states that
the court should put appropriate safeguards in place so that “advance
notice is given to all parties of foreseeable circumstances that may lead the
proponent to offer testimony by transmission.”203 These two requirements
are contradictory. If a party can reasonably foresee a situation where he
may need to offer testimony by transmission, he must give advance notice
to the participants;204 however, if that party can reasonably foresee a
situation where he may need to offer testimony by transmission, he “will 
have special difficulty in showing good cause and the compelling nature
of the circumstances.”205 
The courts should not interpret the good-cause-in-compelling-
circumstances requirement to contemplate foreseeability,206 as that is what
creates this misguided preference for recorded deposition testimony over
live remote testimony. The two should be considered functionally coequal.
Therefore, it should be left to the discretion of the judge and parties to
decide which form of testimony is most appropriate in the particular
circumstances that may arise in a case. 
C. Rule 43(a) Creates the Zoom Paradox
On two separate occasions, the Advisory Committee rejected the idea
that courts may only permit live testimony via videoconference when Rule
32 would permit presentation of a recorded deposition at trial.207 In the
first instance, the Committee rejected this proposition because it wanted
the standard for the admission of live remote testimony to be more






207. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Meeting 11
(May 1993); Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of
Meeting 8 (April 1994).
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342 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
flexible.208 The second time it was suggested, the Committee agreed that
if language limiting the use of testimony via videoconferencing to
exceptional circumstances was not added, then the note to the amendment
would need to clearly state that “live [in-person] testimony is
preferable.”209 
At the next meeting, the Committee expressed concern that the use of
remote transmission testimony would only appeal to “trendy” attorneys
who are “with it” and enjoy playing with “all the new toys.”210 Addressing 
these concerns, the Committee added the requirement that only compelling
circumstances justify remote testimony.211 The Committee also stated that
if testimony is needed from an unavailable witness, the parties should
conduct a videotaped trial deposition.212 
By adopting the “compelling circumstances” standard, the Committee
created a situation in which both of the following cases can be considered
a proper interpretation of the rules.213 When witnesses lived more than 100
miles from the courthouse in In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, the
district court held that the circumstances were not sufficiently compelling
to allow the use of testimony via videoconferencing at trial.214 The court
reasoned that the use of a trial deposition pursuant to Rule 32 is a better
alternative when a witness is more than 100 miles from the place of trial.215 
But when witnesses lived more than 100 miles from the courthouse in 
United States ex rel. Lutz v. Berkeley Heartlab, Inc., the district court held
that the circumstances were not sufficiently exceptional to allow the use
of a trial deposition pursuant to Rule 32.216 The court reasoned that live
testimony is preferred over the use of a trial deposition pursuant to Rule
43(a), even live testimony via videoconferencing.217 Considering these
inconsistent holdings, a court can compel a witness who lives more than 
208. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Meeting 11
(May 1993).
209. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Meeting 8
(April 1994).




213. See In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-5169, 2016 WL 723014
(D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2016); United States ex rel. Lutz v. Berkeley Heartlab, Inc., No. 
9:14-230, 2017 WL 6015157 (D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2017).
214. Urethane Antitrust, 2016 WL 723014, at *2.
215. Id.
216. Berkeley Heartlab, 2017 WL 6015157, at *2.
217. Id.
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3432021] COMMENT
100 miles from the place of trial to testify live via videoconference, but
the rules do not permit the witness to testify live via videoconference
because her testimony can be given by means of a trial deposition, which
is also not permitted.218 Thus, the witness is “procedurally available”219 
but “factually unavailable.”220 
D. The Concerns are Outdated
Despite the numerous benefits that the use of videoconferencing can
bring to the federal court system, it is not coequal to physical presence.221 
Testimony by videoconferencing is not the same as in-person testimony,
but with modern technology, it can serve as a convenient, suitable
alternative. The concerns expressed by videoconferencing’s detractors are
outdated and can be easily remedied. Legal practitioners have long
expressed their fear that videoconferencing inhibits the fact-finder’s 
ability to assess the demeanor of a witness.222 This can strike at the heart
of the fact-finder’s perception of a witness’s credibility.223 Some have
argued that these shortcomings are inherent to videoconferencing because
the dynamics of human interaction are based on subtle communications
such as the tone of voice, eye contact, and body-language.224 The
perceived differences between in-person and remote testimony are also
partially a result of easily remediable technical issues.225 Studies have
shown that issues with witness credibility attributed to the use of
218. Compare Urethane Antitrust, 2016 WL 723014, at *2, with Berkeley
Heartlab, 2017 WL 6015157, at *2.
219. The witness does not meet any of the criteria that would cause him to be
deemed unavailable pursuant to Rule 32(a)(4). See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4). The 
witness also can be compelled to testify in open court pursuant to Rule 45(c), which 
contemplates compulsion of live remote testimony. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c).
220. The witness cannot testify remotely because she is limited by the
restrictions of Rule 43(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a). Thus, even though she does
not meet any of the criteria for unavailability under Rule 32(a)(4), she is rendered
unavailable by being precluded from testifying via live remote testimony. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4).
221. Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2005).
222. See, e.g., id.; Kathryn Leader, Closed-Circuit Television Testimony:
Liveness and Truth-Telling, 14 L. TEXT CULTURE 312, 323 (2010) (Can.).
223. See, e.g., Thornton, 428 F.3d at 697.
224. RICHARD FRANCIS, CANADA AGRICULTURAL REVIEW TRIBUNAL,
UNIVERSAL DESIGN AND VIDEOCONFERENCING AT TRIBUNALS: IMPROVING
ACCESS FROM DAY ONE 3 (2015).
225. See BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW INSTITUTE, TECHNOLOGY ASSISTED AND
REMOTE EVIDENCE PRESENTATION: A PRACTICE RESOURCE 39–40 (2014).
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344 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
videoconferencing are caused, in part, by the size of the screen depicting
the witness, the angle at which the camera is recording the witness, and
the physical surroundings in the background of the location from which
the witness is transmitting.226 
However, experiments in criminal, civil, and immigration proceedings
have found that presenting testimony via videoconferencing has little
prejudicial effect on the party who is expected to be prejudiced by the
remote testimony.227 Taking this into account, courts may invoke practical
solutions to combat what little prejudicial effect these technical issues can
cause. For instance, courts can establish and enforce presentation
standards such as installing life-size screens in courtrooms for the
depiction of remote witnesses or ensuring that a witness’s camera angle is
positioned in a way that would minimize the occasions where the witness
looks away.228 Simply requiring witnesses to transmit their testimony from
a dignified setting can also minimize any influence that videoconferencing
may have on a fact-finder’s assessment of the witness.229 Little basis exists
for the belief that videoconferencing has a substantial effect on a fact-
finder’s ability to observe the witness’s testimony.230 Further, courts can
dampen any negative effect videoconferencing may produce with practical
solutions.
In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Maryland v. Craig that the use of
one-way, closed-circuit television transmission for witness testimony did
“not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.”231 The court reasoned that the live transmission of
testimony was permissible when used to further the important state interest
of protecting a child abuse victim from being traumatized by confronting
his abuser during the victim’s face-to-face testimony.232 Although the
Confrontation Clause is not directly applicable to civil trials, the Supreme
Court’s analysis of remote testimony is pertinent to the issue at hand.233 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause’s primary
purpose is to ensure the reliability of evidence against the criminal
defendant through “physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and
226. See id.
227. FRANCIS, supra note 224, at 3; Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in
Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 937–938 (2015).
228. BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 225, at 39–40.
229. Id.
230. Leader, supra note 222, at 325–26.
231. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990).
232. Id.
233. See generally id. at 836.
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observation of demeanor by the trier of fact.”234 The Court further
reasoned that face-to-face testimony by adversarial witnesses is not an
essential component of the confrontation right.235 The Court found that
face-to-face testimony may have subtle effects on criminal proceedings,
but when the witness is under oath and subject to cross-examination, and
the trier of fact can observe the witness’s demeanor and body by video
monitor, the testimony is reliable in a way “functionally equivalent to that
accorded live, in-person testimony.”236 
The Advisory Committee also expressed doubts about whether
technology available in 1996 was reliable enough to support the remote
transmission of testimony.237 The note attached to the 1996 amendment to 
Rule 43(a) says that the amendment is not meant to specify the means of
transmission that a court may allow.238 In fact, the minutes and reports 
from the meetings discussing this 1996 amendment suggest that the
Advisory Committee primarily considered transmission via telephone,
mentioning video transmission without ever considering the means of
video transmission or the possibility for the witness to simultaneously
view and be viewed by the parties.239 
The express statements about telephone transmission demonstrate this
lack of consideration:240 there is a recurring concern about providing
advance notice to the opposing counsel so that she may have an 
234. Id. at 837.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 851–52.
237. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Meeting 14
(Oct. 1994).
238. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment.
239. See Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of
Meeting (May 1993); Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes
of Meeting 13–14 (Oct. 1994); Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure,
Meeting Report Exhibit 2, at 1, 3 (Dec. 1994).
240. See Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of
Meeting 11 (May 1993) (“One member of the Committee observed that with
suitable protective provisions covering such matters as the people who can be 
present with the witness, telephone testimony is as satisfactory as reliance on a
deposition.”); Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of
Meeting 13–14 (Oct. 1994) (expressing how permitting testimony via remote
transmission would force lawyers to choose between trusting “unseen
arrangements made by others” or “arranging to be present with the witness in
person.”); Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Meeting Report
Exhibit 2, at 1, 3 (Dec. 1994) (discussing how providing advance notice of the
intent to use remote testimony provides the opportunity to supplement transmitted
testimony with a recorded video deposition).
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346 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
opportunity to supplement the transmitted testimony with a video-
recorded deposition.241 The Committee even went so far as to expressly
state that the amendment does not contemplate transmission by facsimile
and “direct computer communication.”242 The Advisory Committee’s
concerns about seeing witness demeanor and the reliability of the
technology for transmission were well founded at the time; however,
technology has progressed rapidly since 1996. 
When the amendment to Rule 43(a) was enacted, the top-of-the-line 
desktop videoconferencing technology only produced video showing
approximately 10–20 frames per second at a nearly $7,000 price point.243 
Today, free videoconferencing software can transmit video at more than
30 frames per second using a camera that costs less than $13.244 Modern
technology can actually transmit a video that is so smooth that a human
eye cannot distinguish the video from reality.245 
Additionally, CERN made the World Wide Web publicly available
just three years before the Supreme Court amended Rule 43(a) in 1996.246 
The Committee writing the 1996 amendment could not predict the
technological revolution that was dawning at the time. Internet speeds
241. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Meeting Report
Exhibit 2, at 3 (Dec. 1994).
242. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Meeting 12
(May 1993).
243. P. Harris & F. Wendt, Intel’s technology for videoconferencing, 34 
MGMT. DECISION 34, 37 (1996).
244. USB 2.0 HD Web Cam with Mic for Computer PC Laptop Desktop
Webcam, with Built-in MIC for Facebook Youtube Instagram Video Live Clip-on 




245. See generally L.E. Humes, et al., The effects of age on sensory thresholds
and temporal gap detection in hearing, vision, and touch, 71 ATTENTION,
PERCEPTION, & PSYCHOPHYSICS 860, 866 fig. 2 (2009) (finding the mean gap-
detection threshold for vision in young adults is slightly below 20 milliseconds,
and the mean gap-detection threshold for vision in older adults is slightly above
20 milliseconds). The average adult’s brain recognizes a change in visual stimulus
approximately every 20 milliseconds. Therefore, the average human perceives 
visual stimulus at approximately 50 frames-per-second or 50 hertz. Computer
processors and cameras have progressed to the point that a video can be
transmitted at a frame rate higher than 50 hertz.
246. See European Organization for Nuclear Research [CERN], Statement
Concerning CERN W3 Software Release Into Public Domain (April 30, 1993).
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3472021] COMMENT
have dramatically increased in recent years.247 In 1996, the standard
internet speed was 28.8 kilobytes per second.248 The recommended
minimum speed for videoconferencing is 384 kilobytes per second.249 At
the end of 2007, the average internet speed in the United States was 3,640
kilobytes per second.250 By 2017, the average internet speed had increased
to 18,750 kilobytes per second, over 646 times faster than the average
speed in 1996.251 Access to the internet has also increased over time. In
2018, the U.S. Census Bureau found that 91.8% of households in America
paid for a broadband internet subscription.252 Still, videoconferencing
technology is not equally accessible in all communities across America.
Although the average availability of the technology necessary to
communicate via videoconference has increased, economic disparities and
other factors may impede an individual’s access. However, unequal access
to technology alone should not preclude the adoption of
videoconferencing in courts, especially when there are measures that
courts may take to address that issue.253 
In the 24 years since the adoption of the 1996 amendment, technology
has evolved at an unprecedented pace. Much like how the development of
the interstate highway system and the commercial jetliner made it easier
for litigants and witnesses to travel to distant courts,254 the development of
247. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, OBI TECH. PAPER NO. 4: BROADBAND 
PERFORMANCE (2010).
248. Id.
249. Ashdown & Menzel, supra note 97, at 92 n.207; ERICH P.
SCHELLHAMMER, A TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITY FOR COURT MODERNIZATION:
REMOTE APPEARANCES 13 (2013).
250. AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, AVERAGE INTERNET CONNECTION SPEED IN THE
UNITED STATES FROM 2007 TO 2017 (IN MBPS), BY QUARTER (July 22, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/616210/average-internet-connection-speed-
in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/BC4J-E7SC].
251. Compare AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 250, with FED. COMMC’NS 
COMM’N, supra note 247.
252. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH A COMPUTER AND
PAID INTERNET SUBSCRIPTION BY STATE: 2018, ProQuest Statistical Abstract of
the U.S., 2020 Online Edition, https://statabs.proquest.com/sa/docview.html?tab
le-no=1181&acc-no=C7095-1.24&year=2020&z=4FAA820BE5B3DFA6147EF
0A5F5DB0C54EAF64E8F&accountid=12154 [https://perma.cc/A4GX-5S8S].
253. See discussion infra Part V.
254. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (discussing 
how advances in modern transportation and communication made the burden of
litigating in a foreign state much less substantial); see also Fitzgerald v. Texaco,
Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 456 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (discussing how the 
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348 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
videoconferencing technology has made it so that litigants and witnesses
can have convenient access to courts with relatively little need to travel.
However, Rule 43(a) is an obstacle, preventing federal courts in the United
States from taking advantage of the technology.255 Rule 43(a) must be
amended to provide a more lenient standard for the use of
videoconferencing in courts. In order to craft the proper solution, the
Advisory Committee can inform its opinion on how to go forward by
looking to Canada, whose rules for permitting videoconferencing in court
are more lenient than those of the United States.256 
IV. LOOKING TO THE GREAT WHITE NORTH FOR GUIDANCE
Canadian courts adopted rules that allowed for courts to use
videoconferencing in judicial proceedings at approximately the same time
as the United States.257 Although adopted at the same time, the rules that
Canadian courts adopted are far less restrictive than their American
counterparts.258 The geography and climate of Canada makes testimony 
via videoconferencing a useful tool for many of the provincial courts as
well as the federal court system.259 Fears over the use of videoconferencing
in American courts can be assuaged by looking at how its use has unfolded
in Canada.
A. Canadian Federal and Provincial Courts
Canada Federal Court Rule 32 authorizes the use of technology for
remote appearances in a “hearing.”260 The Supreme Court of Canada has
not decided whether a “hearing” applies to a trial, but lower Canadian
courts have held that the rule should be interpreted liberally.261 There are
“extraordinary development of worldwide economical air travel by jet” made
traveling to a distant forum substantially easier).
255. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
256. Compare Federal Courts Rules, SOR/1998-106 § 32 (Can.), with FED. R.
CIV. P. 43(a).
257. E.g., Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 1.08 (Can.);
British Columbia Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, 124, § 73 (Can.); Federal Courts
Rules, SOR/1998-106 § 32 (Can.).
258. Compare Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 1.08
(Can.), and British Columbia Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, 124, § 73 (Can.), and
Federal Courts Rules, SOR/1998-106 § 32 (Can.), with FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
259. See BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 225, at 56.
260. Federal Courts Rules, SOR/1998-106 § 32 (Can.).
261. Farzam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), 2005 F.C. 1453,
para. 28 (Can.).
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3492021] COMMENT
no particular guidelines that provide when courts should allow the use of
videoconferencing, but courts take into consideration any prejudice that
the parties may incur from conducting the hearing remotely and the
principle that the rules should be interpreted “so as to serve the just, most
expeditious and least expensive determination of every proceeding on its
merits.”262 
Alberta’s Rules of Court allow courts to conduct “electronic hearings”
in which all participants can hear each other, regardless of whether
participants and the court can see each other.263 Upon request of a party,
the judge may make the decision to conduct electronic hearings based
entirely on the court’s discretion, taking into consideration whether the
parties agree to conduct the hearing remotely.264 Courts have interpreted 
this rule to allow hearings, witness examinations, and even trials to be
conducted in whole or in part by electronic means.265 
Most provinces have similar rules that provide broad discretion to
courts to allow the use of videoconferencing in hearings.266 Although each 
province has established its own rules on using videoconferencing at trials
and hearings, most provinces seem to turn to Ontario’s rules and case law
on this issue.267 In Sandhu v. Siri Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara of Alberta, 
the Alberta Court of the Queen’s Bench relied heavily on Ontario’s Rules 
of Civil Procedure and case law from Ontario’s provincial court to
determine when to apply Alberta’s rule allowing for the use of
videoconferencing.268 Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and 
Labrador also have rules that are nearly identical to Ontario and thus, use
Ontario case law to help interpret the rules.269 
262. Rovi Guides, Inc. v. Videotron Ltd., 2020 F.C. 596, para.18 (Can.);
Farzam, 2005 F.C. 1453, para. 27 (quoting Federal Rule 3) (Can.).
263. Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2020 § 6.10 (Can.).
264. Id.
265. Sandhu v. Siri Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara of Alberta, 2020 ABQB 359
(Can.).
266. See generally Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 1.08
(Can.); Prince Edward Island R. of Civ. Proc. 1.08 (Can.).
267. See Sandhu, 2020 ABQB 359 (Can.); Prince Edward Island R. of Civ.
Proc. 1.08 (Can.); N.L. Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986, 47A (Can.).
268. Sandhu, 2020 ABQB 359 (Can.).
269. Prince Edward Island R. of Civ. Proc. 1.08 (Can.); N.L. Rules of the
Supreme Court, 1986, 47A (Can.).
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350 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
B. Ontario’s Courts
So long as equipment is available at the court or provided by a party,
Rule 1.08 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure allows courts to conduct
nearly all hearings and proceedings by telephone or videoconference.270 
Originally, the rule required the consent of the parties to conduct the
proceedings remotely; however, in 2008 Rule 1.08(3) was amended to
allow courts to order remote proceedings on their own initiative.271 Rule 
1.08(5) provides a list of factors that a court should consider when
determining whether to permit telephone or videoconferencing.272 Courts 
have interpreted this list of factors as an “acknowledgement of the
usefulness of taking evidence by way of a video conference” rather than a
barrier that allows it only under exceptional circumstances.273 This
provides a stark contrast to the requirements provided in the Rule’s
American counterpart.274 
Though courts in Ontario have interpreted Rule 1.08 as encouraging
the use of videoconferencing in hearings and proceedings—refusing to
read-in harsher restrictions than the law requires—judges must still 
exercise their discretion judiciously when determining whether to use
270. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 1.08(1) (Can.).
Courts are allowed to use videoconferencing to conduct motion hearings,
application hearings, status hearings, trials, hearings for directions on reference,
appeals and motions for leave to appeal, pre-trial conferences, and proceedings
for judicial review.
271. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 1.08(3) (Can.).
272. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 1.08(5) (Can.) (In
deciding whether to permit or to direct a telephone or videoconference, “the court
shall consider, (a) the availability of telephone conference or video conference
facilities; (b) the general principle that evidence and argument should be presented
orally in open court; (c) the importance of the evidence to the determination of
the issues in the case; (d) the effect of the telephone conference or video
conference on the court’s ability to make findings, including determinations about
the credibility of witnesses; (e) the importance in the circumstances of the case of
observing the demeanour of a witness; (f) whether a party, witness or lawyer for
a party is unable to attend because of infirmity, illness or any other reason; (g) the
balance of convenience between the party wishing the telephone or video
conference and the party or parties opposing; and (h) any other relevant matter.”).
273. Midland Res. Holdings Ltd. v. Shtaif, 2009 CanLII 67669, para. 24 (Can. 
O.N.S.C.).
274. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
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3512021] COMMENT
videoconferencing.275 The court in Midland Resources Holdings Ltd. v. 
Shtaif warned of the broad discretionary power Rule 1.08 provides to 
judges.276 The court reasoned that the decision should be made on a case-
by-case basis depending on what is most just and convenient, given the
facts of the case.277 The court recognized that if the quality of the
connection was poor, it would impact the clarity of the video.278 However, 
the Midland court also reasoned that because videoconferencing allows
courts to reliably view the witness with clarity, courts should encourage
the use of videoconferencing.279 Therefore, so long as the judge exercised
proper discretion, the use of videoconferencing should be encouraged.280 
When addressing the use of videoconferencing for witness
examination in preparation for a judicial mini-trial281 in Arconti v. Smith, 
Justice Myers of the Ontario Superior court declared, “It’s 2020.”282 
Observing that communications technology has vastly improved, Justice
Myers said, “We no longer record evidence using quill and ink. In fact, we
apparently do not even teach children to use cursive writing in all schools
anymore. We now have the technological ability to communicate remotely 
effectively.”283 Justice Myers opined that modern technology provides a
more efficient and cost-effective alternative to personal attendance, so
courts should not reject this new technology.284 
Justice Myers dismissed the concern that counsel would not be able to
give as effective of a presentation via videoconference, saying that the
“use of readily available technology is part of the basic skillset required of
civil litigators and courts.”285 He opined that videoconferencing is not the
answer to everything, but rather is a tool to be used.286 Use of technology
will not necessarily “produce perfection,” but many of the concerns
275. Compare Midland Res. Holdings, 2009 CanLII 67669, para. 22 (Can.
O.N.S.C.), and Concord Adex Inc. v. 20/20 Mgmt. Ltd., 2017 O.R. 3897 (Can.),
with 1337194 Ontario Inc. v. Whitely, 2004 Carswell Ont. 2312 (Can.).
276. Midland Res. Holdings, 2009 CanLII 67669, para. 22 (Can.).
277. Id.
278. Id. at para. 26.
279. Id.
280. Id. at para. 22.
281. A judicial mini-trial is a structured negotiated settlement technique,
designed like an expedited trial, which allows the parties to present their cases and
have a judge render a non-binding opinion on how the dispute should be resolved.
The judge who conducts the judicial mini-trial will not sit as the trial judge.
282. Arconti v. Smith, 2020 O.R. 2872, para. 19 (Can.).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at para. 33.
286. Id. at para. 20.
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352 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
expressed are a result of unfamiliarity with videoconferencing.287 It’s not
as “horrible as it is uncomfortable.”288 
In Arconti, the court recognized concerns about abusing the use of
videoconferencing to cheat but reasoned that an unfounded fear of abuse
was not a good basis to not use technology.289 The court pointed out that
parties could use hand signals or Bluetooth technology to improperly
prompt witness testimony when the parties are in the same room in court;
thus, the risk of clandestine witness coaching is not unique to
videoconferencing.290 The court also addressed the fear that counsel’s
team and clients would be separated and thus not able to communicate
with one another in the way they would in court.291 Justice Myers quickly 
dismissed this as a result of being uncomfortable with technology and
suggested that in the same way that litigators must learn to handle junior
counsel whispering information to them during an examination or
argument in court, litigators must learn to do the same with technology.292 
Similarly, in the United States, an attorney’s technological
incompetence is not a valid reason to avoid the use of videoconferencing
technology. In 2012, the American Bar Association added commentary on
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility to provide that
lawyers should “keep abreast of changes in law and its practice” in the
form of continuing their legal education and understanding relevant
technology.293 Thirty-eight states have since adopted this requirement into
their individual rules of professional conduct.294 Professor Dane Ciolino 
of the Loyola University New Orleans College of Law has opined that all
states should likewise adopt versions of this requirement of technological
competency into their rules.295 
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, counsel’s ignorance of
videoconferencing technology may have been excusable and given some
weight in considering the use of videoconferencing; however, a reasonable
argument no longer exists for counsel to be inept in the use of
videoconferencing. Counsel who is not reasonably knowledgeable about
widespread technological advances in the practice of law would likely be
287. Id. at para 43.
288. Id.
289. Id. at para. 25–26.
290. Id. at para. 25.
291. Id. at para. 37.
292. Id.
293. MODEL RULES OF PRO. RESP. r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1983).
294. DANE S. CIOLINO, LOUISIANA LEGAL ETHICS: STANDARDS AND 
COMMENTARY 15 (2020).
295. Id. at 16.
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3532021] COMMENT
considered incompetent.296 Moreover, when weighing the conveniences of
the parties for forum non conveniens and changes of venue pursuant to
§ 1404, most courts find the convenience of counsel is irrelevant, improper
to consider, or entitled to very little weight.297 Thus, an argument that
courts should avoid videoconferencing technology due to an attorney’s
unfamiliarity is absurd. Unlike U.S. federal courts, Canadian courts have
been able to adapt to the changes in videoconferencing technology with
ease due to their lenient standards for allowing live testimony via
videoconferencing in court.298 U.S. federal courts need not adopt the broad 
discretion for the use of videoconferencing technology found in Canadian
law. The mere fact that the Canadian judicial system has not suffered,
despite the vast discretion given to judges, should embolden the Judicial
Conference to adapt its own rules in light of this technological innovation.
V. A CONVENIENT SOLUTION
Informed by a thorough analysis of the Canadian and U.S. systems,
the Judicial Conference should recommend that the Supreme Court amend
Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to establish a standard
for using videoconferencing for testimony at trials and hearings that
provides judges with greater discretion, while also providing parties with
a means of litigating in a convenient manner. Ideally, the Supreme Court
should amend Rule 43(a) to state:
At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in open court
unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, these rules,
or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. 
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, and with due regard to the importance of in-person
testimony in open court, a court may permit testimony in open
court by contemporaneous transmission from a different
location.299 
Rather than establishing a list of prerequisites to meet before judges
may use their discretion, the proposed amendment provides judges with
great discretion on whether to permit testimony via contemporaneous
296. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. RESP. r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1983).
297. 17 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 111.13 (3d
ed. 2020); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 3850.
298. See generally Arconti v. Smith, 2020 O.R. 2782 (Can.).
299. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (emphasis added to show proposed amendment).
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354 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
transmission. The proposed amendment merely provides general concepts
that should guide judges on what to consider in their analysis. 
A. Interpretation of the Amendment
By considering the “convenience of parties and witnesses,” a judge
should first consider the relative circumstances of the parties and 
witnesses, keeping in mind that if the witness and parties consent to
conducting testimony via remote transmission, little reason exists to deny
this request.300 Consideration of the “interest of justice” reminds judges 
that although their analysis is based primarily on providing the parties with
a speedy, inexpensive, and convenient resolution to the action, providing
justice is the most important priority.301 Thus, although convenient, if a 
judge were to discern that permitting testimony via remote transmission
would impair the imposition of justice, that judge should not allow it.
Finally, by providing that judges should give “due regard to the
importance of in-person testimony in open court” in making their
determination, the statute reaffirms the position that although leave to
testify via remote transmission should be liberally given, technical glitches
and other potential shortfalls make it so that videoconferencing should not
wholly replace the use of live in-person testimony.302 
B. A Solution to Most Doubts: Resurrect the Phone Bank
One of the primary concerns regarding the increased use of
videoconferencing in courts is that videoconferencing disposes of the
ceremony of trial and solemnity of the courtroom, both of which impose a
truth-telling force on witnesses.303 Indeed, there may be a sense of drama
that accompanies the act of testifying in person that is lost when appearing
remotely. The physical presence of attorneys, parties, and the finder of
300. See generally Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2020 § 6.10(2)(a)
(Can.) (providing that electronic hearings may be permitted if the parties agree to
hold it in such a way); accord FED R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to
1996 amendment (providing that courts may find good cause in compelling
circumstances when parties agree that testimony should be offered via remote
transmission); see also discussion supra Part II.
301. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]
should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”).
302. See generally discussion supra Part III.
303. See FED R. CIV. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment;
FRANCIS, supra note 224, at 3.
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3552021] COMMENT
fact, in a neutral setting, may create a discomfort and pressure for a witness
that can be helpful to the examination process.304 That same witness, when
testifying via videoconference from a favorite armchair at home, would
likely not feel that same pressure to tell the truth as he or she would if
providing testimony in person.305 Although courts should not solely rely
upon this issue to dispose of the use of videoconferencing, it is a concern
that should be addressed.
In a letter to a local bar association, Judge Dennis Bailey of the 17th
Judicial Circuit of Florida scolded lawyers for dressing inappropriately
when attending hearings via videoconference.306 Attorneys had appeared
shirtless, in bed, and even lounging poolside.307 These instances are
demonstrative of how court participants may shrug aside the solemnity and
gravity of legal proceedings when the physical aspects of a proceeding are
stripped away.308 However, there are measures that courts may employ to
maintain the solemnity of the space while using videoconferencing
technology. For instance, the District Court of Western Australia has
issued a rule that requires that the room in which a virtual appearance takes
place and the dress code of persons appearing virtually must “maintain the
dignity and solemnity of the court, consistent with the venue being treated
as part of the court room for this purpose.”309 
Although establishing rules that help to preserve the solemnity of the
courtroom is likely effective, there is an alternative solution that may be
better. The proliferation of cellphones has left empty, unused phonebanks
in many federal courthouses across the country. Once bustling
phonebanks, the payphones themselves have been removed and all that
remains are empty compartments and booths. For example, in 2013, the
Eastern District of New York removed 25 public payphones, leaving
empty phone booths in the Brooklyn Federal Courthouse.310 In the 
304. Arconti v. Smith, 2020 O.R. 2872, para. 27 (Can.).
305. Id.
306. Dennis Bailey, Virtual View from the Bench During the COVID-19 
Pandemic: A Letter from the Honorable Dennis Bailey, https://www.westonbar
.org/so/61N5VoOJe?fbclid=IwAR3gBGUaUfpC8qs0612nMrw-lSDgZkDFiOiC
cKGXBjd3SDS8PisCrslHN6c#/main [https://perma.cc/RU3E-6W2D] (last visited
Oct. 1, 2020).
307. Id.
308. See generally id.
309. District Court of Western Australia, Practice Direction No 2.5 of 2019:
Obligations of the Applicant (14 July 2020).
310. John Marzulli, Budget Cuts See Major Pay Phone Hangup at Brooklyn
Federal Courthouse, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.nydailynews.com
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356 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Southern District of New York, there are 46 more empty phone booths
lying unused in the Daniel Patrick Moynihan and the White Plains federal
courthouses.311 
The U.S. federal court system should utilize these spaces to set up
areas for individuals to appear for remote proceedings at their local
courthouses. Each booth would contain a camera and a monitor that
individuals could use to appear at any federal courthouse in the country by
simply going to their local federal courthouse. Even in remote regions of
the country, distant from any federal courthouse, individuals can more
easily travel to the nearest federal courthouse than they can across the 
country to the specific courthouse where the in-person proceedings are
taking place. This solution would provide a controlled area, free of
interruption and distraction, for witnesses and pro se litigants to appear
remotely. This solution would ensure the truth-telling force brought on by
the solemnity of the courthouse is not lost because the witnesses would
still be subjected to the solemnity and grandeur of the courthouse from
which they are remotely testifying. Additionally, this solution could 
provide a controlled setting where the court can make sure that the
individual is not receiving any improper coaching or the like when giving
remote testimony.
This solution can also provide videoconferencing technology to those
who would not otherwise have ready access. Although internet access is
widespread, courts should still take into consideration factors that inhibit
an individual’s access to the use of videoconferencing technology, such as
economic inequality. Using phonebanks in this way can provide a reliable 
means of access to videoconferencing technology for those who do not
otherwise have access. This solution, paired with the implementation of
the proposed amendment to Rule 43(a), would allow the federal court
system to provide the public with a speedy, inexpensive, and just method
of litigating claims. 
CONCLUSION
Courts seek to provide litigants with a speedy, inexpensive, and just
resolution to all actions and proceedings.312 In its effort to do this, the court
system has recognized that the invention of the photocopier, the




312. FED R. CIV. P. 1.
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3572021] COMMENT
much more convenient process.313 The adoption of videoconferencing
software for use in court seems to be the next, natural step. However, Rule
43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has severely limited the use
of videoconferencing for testimony by requiring that courts only permit it
when there is good cause in compelling circumstances.314 
The Judicial Conference should recommend that the Supreme Court
amend Rule 43(a) to allow for remote testimony at the discretion of the
presiding judge, with deference to scenarios where the parties consent to
presenting witness testimony remotely. This would not only serve the
court system by providing a more efficient means of conducting
proceedings, but it would also provide greater and more convenient access
to judicial relief for the aggrieved. Coupled with an effort to transform
unused phone booths in federal courthouses into spaces for remote
testimony, this proposed amendment will ensure a “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”315 
The world will never be the same after the COVID-19 pandemic ends.
Twenty years passed before the Second Circuit adopted the evolution of
the concept of convenience as laid out by Judge Oakes in Effron.316 
Twenty-four years have passed since federal courts were first allowed to
utilize videoconferencing technology.317 It’s time to adapt. “It’s 2020.”318 
313. See generally McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957);
Hanson v Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d
Cir. 1995); Calix-Chacon v. Glob. Int’l Marine, Inc., 493 F.3d 507, 515 (5th Cir.
2007).
314. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
315. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
316. See generally Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Oakes, J., dissenting); Effron, 67 F.3d 7.
317. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
318. Arconti v. Smith, 2020 O.R. 2872, para. 19 (Can.).
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